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THE EFFECT OF DESEGREGATION ON PUBLIC SCHOOL
BONDS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES
In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education' six recent cases arising
in four states 2 have involved a constitutional challenge to the validity
of an issue of public bonds to finance segregated schools. In each
ease it was contended that bonds authorized and approved according
to statute could not be validated or the proceeds used for a purpose
now unconstitutional. Confronting this apparently meritorious contention was the impelling practical consideration of furthering public
education in the already lagging South. Legal answers, embodying
3
this equitable consideration, ranged from a plea to jurisdiction, to
4
interpretation of a statute or bond, to a rationale that while unconstitutional, segregated school facilities are not illegal until integration
has had local legal recognition. 5 The outstanding similarities in these
cases were the attitude of the courts and the result; the courts were
unanimous in sustaining the validity of the issue and in rejecting the
contention of unconstitutionality. Striking, however, is the fact that
no two states refused to invalidate the bonds on the same ground,
and that no general technique received approval in more than two
courts. If for no other reason, this kaleidoscopic divergence of solution would be of sufficient legal interest to deserve comment.
A perhaps more compelling reason for a legal examination of these
cases is that, unlike many legal problems, substantial implications
dollar-wise are involved. The private investor does not want to
"buy a lawsuit"; he does not want to purchase a bond with a constitutional cloud, even if reasonably certain of the bond's soundness.
Reluctance on the part of private investors and syndicates to bid on
public school bonds is being unhappily recognized wherever bonds
1. 347 U.s. 483 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Brown case arising in
Kansas was heard with the companion cases of Gebhart v. Belton from Delaware, Briggs v. Elliott from South Carolina and Davis v. County School Board
of Prince Edward County from Virginia. Together with Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955), declaring segregation contrary
to the fifth amendment in the District of Columbia, these cases are popularly
xeferred to as The School Segregation Cases.

2. These cases, discussed more fully infra, are:
Florida:Florida v. Special Tax School Dist. No. 1 of Dade County, 86 So. 2d
419 (Fla. 1956); Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County v. Florida,
75 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1954);
North Carolina: Doby v. Brown, 232 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1956), affirming
135 F. Supp: 584 (M.D.N.C. 1955); Constantian v. Anson County, 244 N.C. 221,
93 S.E.2d 163 (1956);

Oklahoma: Matlock v. Board of County Comm'rs of Wagoner County, 281
P.2d 169 (Okla. 1955) ;
Virginia: County School Bd. of Hanover County v. Shelton, 198 Va. 226,
93 S.E.2d 469 (1956).

3. Doby v. Brown, supra note 2.
4. Constantian v. Anson County and Matlock v. Board of County Comm'rs,
supra note 2.
5. Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County v. Florida and Florida
-v. Special Tax School Dist. No. 1 of Dade County, supra note 2.
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are issued for segregated schools; the few bids that are received, and
some issues have found no bidders at all, are often unreasonably higher
than bonds of similar grade issued at the same time for other purposes
or for financing the school systems of northern states. Only speculation suggests what part each of three elements--"tight money," which
is "tighter" in the southern states than elsewhere, the investor's reluctance to lend money for financing segregated schools on moral
grounds or integrated schools for fear of citizen retaliation, and his
fear of litigation-have had in the creation of abnormally high interest rates for Southern school bonds. 6 But at any rate fear of
legal attack seems to be an element which, however large or small,
has added to the woe of the Southern states.
Contention of Assailants of Bonds
Contentions essentially similar were urged by all parties assailing
the validity of the bonds. First and fundamentally, the bonds were
authorized for financing segregated schools only. Bonds issued prior
to Brown v. Board of Education must have been so issued, for state
constitutions and statutes declared that school systems must be segregated; bonds issued for another purpose, namely, to finance nonsegregated schools, would have been invalid ab initio. Bonds issued
subsequent thereto were so done in contemplation of, and for the sole
purpose of, continued segregation of school facilities. Whichever
the case, either the scope of authorization for which the bonds were
approved was exceeded, or, if not, then the authorization itself was
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. In either event,
claimed the contestants, the bonds were invalid.
The state courts. hearing this contention faced two determinative
questions. First, were the bonds authorized for financing segregated
schools only? And, second, if the bonds were so authorized, is the
expenditure of funds for financing schools which must be segregated
constitutional under the fourteenth amendment? Three of the cases
met issue on the first question, holding for three different reasons that
the bonds were not authorized solely for segregated schools, and,
therefore, the bonds were valid.7 Nonetheless in two Florida cases
the court seems to have conceded that the only authorized purpose
for which the bonds were issued was for financing segregated schools
and met squarely the question of unconstitutionality.8 The School
6. Much discussion of these factors has appeared in financial publications
under various topics relating to school financing, bond markets, credit policies
of the government and integration of public schools in general. See, e.g., "Integration Mixup Snarls New School Financing," Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29,
1957 p. 1.
7. These are the
notes 10 through 21
8. These are the
notes 27 through 39

Constantian, Matlock and Shelton cases, discussed infra,
and related text.
Manatee County and Dade County cases, discussed infra,
and related text.
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Segregation Cases9 had determined that compulsory segregation was
unconstitutionalbut it had not ruled that the maintaining of segregated schools was illegal. The Florida Supreme Court faced the seemingly insoluble dilemma, whether to declare school bonds forever
valid for a purpose which, while unconstitutional, was nonetheless
not illegal.
Dispositionon Non-ConstitutionalGrounds
While four of the six cases were decided on non-constitutional
grounds, no two courts employed quite the same technique. Apparent
in all of the decisions, however, is the attitude of the courts favoring
the validity of the bond issue on any ground whatever.
A. Construction of School Code: Matlock v. Board of County
Comm'rs'0 was decided on an interpretation of the Oklahoma School
Code. Taxpayers had brought a class action to enjoin the issuance
of bonds voted for the construction and repair of separate schools,
asserting the bonds' unconstitutionality. Since the School Code provided for the maintenance of separate schools under a system of
segregation, which was declared unconstitutional by Brown v. Board
of Education, it was argued that the bonds were invalid because
authorized for an unconstitutional purpose. A lower court judgment
declaring the bonds invalid was reversed by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. Provisions governing the acquisition and maintenance of
school property, the court held, were untouched by the doctrine of
the School SegregationCases which outlawed statutes requiring separate schools for white and colored students. The court reasoned that
authorization of the bond issue was determined by specific statutes
governing it, and not by the School Code in general; hence, although
other parts of the School Code are unconstitutional, provisions for
the acquisition, repair and maintenance of school property were not
invalidated by the Supreme Court's decision. "[I]t was not the intention of the United States Supreme Court to . . . cripple the normal
functioning of the school systems of the states affected during the
period of changing from segregated to non-segregated schools."" Commenting also that the Oklahoma School Code, if ambiguous, is to be
education may be adconstrued liberally to the extent that public
12
vanced, the court declared the bonds valid.
B. Severability of

Unconstitutional Provisions: Constantian v.

9. As noted above, this is the popular nane for the cases decided under
the style of Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 1.
10. 281 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1955), 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 136, 35 NEB. L. REv. 133
(1956).
11. 281 P.2d at 171.
12. "[I]t is our duty . . .to construe the Oklahoma School Code so that
public education may be advanced in this state." Ibid.
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Anson County, 13 arising in North Carolina, involved a suit to restrain
the issuance of previously approved school bonds on the ground that
the bonds were authorized in contemplation of constitutional and
statutory provisions requiring racially segregated schools and therefore could not be utilized for non-segregated schools. The North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the provisions of the state constitution and statutes providing for setting up and operating a system
of public schools were severable from the invalid provisions requiring
mandatory separation of races; thus the bonds could be legally issued
notwithstanding the invalidity of those provisions. While recognizing
that unconstitutional provisions of the code constitute part of the
contract of indebtedness, the opinion seems to say that these provisions may be severed without invalidating the entire contract.
The approach of the North Carolina court is possibly distinguishable
from that of the Matlock case which refused to recognize that the
unconstitutional portions of the code were part of the original contract of issue; this case indicates that they were, but holds that they
can be severed in the interest of construing the statute for the
improvement of educational facilities. The bond issue is in essence
contractual, and an illegal provision may be 'stricken from a contract
14
The
if it does not constitute an essential feature of the agreement.
problem inherent in the solution of severability, not encountered in
the other approaches, is that if this contract of indebtedness is nonseparable, the requirement of segregation may be so material that
the entire bond is vitiated.' 5 This of course is purely a question for
interpretation by state courts following state law.
C. Purpose for Which Authorized by Voters: In the Virginia case
of County School Bd. of Hanover County v. Shelton 16 the plaintiff, as
a taxpayer, sought to enjoin the School Board from spending the
proceeds of a school bond issue. Alleging that the school bonds were
authorized by an election prior to the School Segregation Cases, in
which the electors authorized the bonds only for use in racially
segregated schools, he contended that the proceeds of the issue could
not be utilized for schools which might not be segregated. The plaintiff contended therefore, that the purpose for which the. proceeds
would be spent was different from the purpose for which authorized
by the voters, namely, "to promote segregated public schools and
for that purpose only."' 7 The trial court granted the injunction 8
13. 244 N.C. 221, 93 S.E.2d 163 (1956), 1 RACE EEL. L. REP. 658.

14. See 12 AM. JuR., Contracts § 220 (1938).

15. E.g., Allard v. Madison Township Bd. of Education, 101 Ohio St. 469, 129

N.E. 718 (1920) (joining an unauthorized purpose with one that is authorized
invalidates the entire bond issue because the voters should have an opportunity to vote on each provision separately; otherwise it is impossible to
determine if the vote approved the legitimate purpose).
16. 198 Va. 226, 93 S.E.2d 469 (1956), 1 RACE REL.L. REP. 666.
17. 93 S.E.2d at 470.
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and appeal was taken to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
This court reversed, holding that the proceeds could be used for the
purpose for which voted, namely, "for the construction of school
improvements... for white and negro school children."' 9 The reason
for incurring the indebtedness was to remedy the "desperate need
of school improvements," not to authorize continued segregated facilities; hence the doctrine of the School SegregationCases "has no place
in the determination of the question before us."20
It should be noted that the contention of this plaintiff involved only
the assertion for disposition in a state court whether the voters in
fact authorized the bond issue solely for segregated schools. It is
axiomatic that the will of the electorate should govern, provided it
can be ascertained. 21 However, it is difficult to determine the subjective intent of voters authorizing the issue, and even more difficult
for a litigant to establish where it contravenes the strong policy
consideration of promoting public education. This case is distinguishable from the Matlock and Constantiancases, in which the purpose of
authorization was determined by the terms of the statute and bond;
the decision in this case was based upon a failure of the assailant to
establish that the will of the electorate supported his contention.
D. No Federal Jurisdiction: In Doby v. Brown 22 plaintiffs sought
federal court assistance under the Civil Rights Act2 to enjoin a state
condemnation proceeding against their land. They alleged that the
statute authorizing the issuance of school bonds for school construction
was enacted prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in the School Segregation Cases and in contemplation of state laws
requiring segregation in public schools, and that the proceeds thereof
could not legally be used for schools which might not be segregated.
The court of appeals affirmed a dismissal, holding that no federal
question was involved, and that, even if there were, the federal court
should not assume jurisdiction where the issue involved interpretation
of a state statute which could be determined in the pending condemna18. The opinion of the lower court is noted with favor in 41 VA. L. REV. 1159
(1955).
19. 93 S.E.2d at 471.
20. Id. at 472.
21. See, e.g., Kinder v. School Dist. No. 126, 68 Wash. 410, 123 Pac. 610 (1912).
22. 232 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1956), affirming 135 F. Supp. 584 (M.D.N.C. 1955),
1 RACE REL. L. REP. 662, 664 (1956).
23. The salient provision under which perhaps a preponderance of segregation litigation is brought is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1950). This section reads:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be conunenced by any person:
"(3)

To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States."

19571

NOTES

tion proceeding. The approach of the court is similar in legal analysis
to the Matlock and Constantian cases and typical of other southern
courts in its dauntless attitude that school finance should not be entangled in the social struggle over desegregation. 24 Regardless of the
court's predisposition,2 the decision reached appears manifestly correct. The scope of authorization of a school bond is purely a state
question; no other question was necessary to the disposition of the
case. The question whether one would be deprived of equal protection of the laws by the use of proceeds for segregated schools subsequent to the cessation of segregation is not clear, but the lower court
seems to indicate that no redress would be available under the Civil
Rights Act.26 However, even if federal assistance then was available
to enjoin the use of proceeds for this unconstitutional purpose, it is
more likely that desegregation would be effectuated in another way,
as by contempt proceedings against intervenors.
Dispositionon ConstitutionalGround
The leading case involving the legality of an issue of school bonds
subsequent to the Brown decision is Board of Public Instruction of
Manatee County v. Florida,27 which was followed in a similar case in
Dade County.28 In the Manatee County case objection was made to
the validation of a bond issue for financing segregated school facilities
on the ground that the recent School Segregation Cases declared segregated education unconstitutional, and that expenditure of funds for
this purpose likewise was unconstitutional. The Florida court declared
the bond issue valid and conclusive upon the rights of the citizens,
though at the same time conceding that its action technically contravened the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
United States Supreme Court had declared that compulsory segregation in public school facilities violated the Federal Constitution; but,
argued the Florida court, segregation, while unconstitutional, is not
illegal in this state. Hence, in view of the need for better school
24. "Federal judges are ill-prepared to sit in judgment in every school
squabble." 135 F. Supp. at 586.
25. The history of the instant case gives further reason to believe that
the court was predisposed to dismiss it. The plaintiffs had already been before

the Supreme Court of North Carolina seeking to block condemnation of their
land on other grounds. Brown v. Doby, 242 N.C. 462, 87 S.E.2d 921 (1955).
And prior to this time the plaintiffs had unsuccessfully attempted in the state
.ourt to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the condemnation suit.
The present action might have seemed a final effort to unearth a technicality
for the benefit of particular plaintiffs yet at the expense of the effective
operation of the school system. For this reason as well as the policy favoring
public education, the federal courts may have been predisposed to dismiss
it on any of the several grounds available.
26. See Doby v. Brown, 135 F. Supp. 584, 585 (1955).
27. 75 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1954), 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 124 (1956), approved in
,8 ALA.L. REv. 127 (1955), criticized in 1 HowARD L. REv. 286 (1955).
28. Florida v. Special Tax Dist. No. 1 of Dade County, 86 So. 2d 419 (Fla.
-1956), 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 527.
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facilities the unconstitutional but not unlawful bond issue may stand.
A concurring justice adopted the approach seen thereafter in the
Matlock case from Oklahoma.2 9 The purpose for which the bond issue
is to be validated is constitutional, for "surely a building in which
the races are mixed will be constructed no differently than one to
be occupied by the white or by the colored." 30
A strong dissenting opinion, agreeing with the majority on little
more than that the fourteenth amendment was never legitimately
adopted and that Brown v. Board of Education was incorrectly decided, 3 ' would declare the bond issue invalid. The Supreme Court
has "now announced," in the Brown case, that segregation is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. "The proposed bond issue [for
segregated schools] . . . is in direct conflict with the United States
Constitution, as now construed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Brown case. Therefore the purpose for which the money
is to be expended is illegal. The purpose being illegal, it follows
'32
that the bonds are illegal.
The implication of this position is not only that the bond issue is
invalid, but that the entire school system is unlawful. The state
alone has the right to create schools. Florida in creating its schools
explicitly authorized only segregated schools. Segregated schools
are now unconstitutional, and it follows that, the sole end result being
unconstitutional, the bonds enhance an invalid purpose and are
themselves invalid. The only alternative, concluded the dissent, is
schools if they
that the electorate must act to provide for integrated
33
are to exist; the court cannot legislate them.
The confusion that would have resulted from an adoption of this
position is manifest; a question of the constitutionality of the entire
school system is considerably more serious than the illegality of a
single bond issue. Faced with the necessity for preserving public
schools, the court chose to adopt the somewhat tenuous rationale
34
that the bond issue, while unconstitutional, is not at this time illegal.
This decision, though criticized, was perhaps correct on its disposition
of the constitutional point; for, had the court held otherwise, the
29. See notes 10 through 12 supra and related text.
30. 75 So. 2d at 840.
31. The majority's statement, "In law . . . the Brown decision was a great
mistake," and comments regarding the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
under "Reconstruction" display the same caustic attitude evident in the
dissent, which said, "Notwithstanding the fact that we may know, which we
do, that the Fourteenth Amendment . . . was never adopted in the manner
we are bound by" the Brown
required by that fundamental document ....
decision. 75 So. 2d at 838, 839 (majority), and 844 (dissent).
32. Id. at 848, 849.
33. 'Under our constitutional system of government, only the electorate
can make this decision." Id. at 849.
34. "Any reasonable pattern for desegregation that may be imposed will
require a long time and the record discloses a pressing necessity for improved
school facilities." Id. at 839-40.
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policy of letting the states solve their own segregation problems would
have been circumvented. It is suggested that the brief concurring
opinion, dodging this constitutional dilemma, would have been a better
path to the decision the court undoubtedly considered necessary.
The approach of the majority, though limited in utility to.matters
arising before state tribunals, has been seen in later cases. In Steiner
v. Simmons, 35 arising after the first but before the second Brown
opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court, conceding that segregation
by race is unconstitutional, refused a.Negro's petition for admission
to a public high school explaining that the United States Supreme
Court has not decreed "desegregation at the present time."36 The
court said, "The Supreme Court of the United States has determined
a right to exist, but has not determined the remedy. Until that remedy
shall be fixed, the right is not a present enforceable one. States
having segregation laws are not required, at the present moment, to
desegregate their schools." 3 7 Since the second Brown decision, the absence of a contention of unconstitutionality in school b6nd case where
there has been no order ending segregation possibly reflects confidence
in the position of the majority in the Manatee County case.
Finally it may be asked, will school bonds authorized exclusively
for segregated facilities remain valid after desegregation has been
decreed, in which case the bonds will be not only unconstitutional but
also illegal? In Florida, site of the Manatee County case, the answer
is in the affirmative; the validity of the bond issue was litigated in a
validation proceeding, which by operation of the doctrine of res
judicata precludes any later suit on the issue of the bond's validity.38
On the other hand, if no validation proceeding has barred subsequent
attack, the answer may be in the negative, that the bonds will be
invalid when desegregation is ordered. Clearly the same equities
militating for support of the school system would be present, but
now segregation is not only unconstitutional but also illegal. The
dissenting justice in the Manatee County case said, "There is no need
to postpone the evil day." 39 In a state whose bonds are unprotected
by a validation judgment, this evil day could become a reality, to the
infelicity of the school district, the bondholder and the private citizen.
Recommendation: Bond Validation Legislation
It is suggested that Southern states wishing to circumvent future
litigation challenging the validity of school bonds, constitutionally or
35. 111 A.2d 574 (Del. 1955). See also Hawkins v. Board of Control, 83
So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1955), rev'd 350 U.S. 413 (1956). Cf., Davis v. Prince Edward
County School Bd., 25 U.S.L. Week 2333 (E.D. Va. 1957).
36. 111 A.2d at 578.
37. Id. at 579.
38. For more detailed discussion see text and notes 40 through 50 infra.
39. 75 So. 2d at 848.
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otherwise, and to preclude the possibility of an "evil day," should
adopt bond validation legislation. Though of course an unconstitutional
state practice cannot be legalized by any sort of state legislation, the
validation proceedings can protect the buyer from a later judgment
declaring the bonds void and the seller from the undesirable situation
of being unable to spend the funds received by the sale of bonds.
There is competent authority to the effect that validation proceedings,
assaulted on many and varied grounds as violating both general and
specific provisions of constitutions, will generally withstand such
40
attacks.
Several states already have legislation providing judicial proceedings for approval of public debentures prior to their issuance or sale.
Notable among Southern states with these statutes are Florida, 41
Georgia, 42 Kansas, 43 Kentucky, 44 Mississippi 45 and Oklahoma. 46
These statutes generally provide that the proceeding for the validation of bonds is an adversary action in a court of competent jurisdiction in which the plaintiff is the issuing county, municipality, or taxing
district, and the defendants are the state or state representatives,
and all taxpayers or citizens of the district or state. 47 This action
is in the nature of an in rem proceeding, or perhaps more correctly,
in the nature of a declaratory judgment in a class action.48 Its
primary purpose is, of course, to immunize the bond issue against any
subsequent charge of invalidity.49 This is accomplished by joining
40. 43 Am. JuR., Public Securities and Obligations § 312 (1942). For discussion of this principle, see Rohde v. Newport, 246 Ky. 476, 55 S.W.2d 368
(1932); Annots., 87 A.L.R. 706 (1933), 102 A.L.R. 90 (1936). The leading
Supreme Court case recognizing the constitutionality of a validation statute
is Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927) (a
validation statute satisfies due process of law requirements and presents a
case or controversy for judicial determination).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 75 (Supp. 1956). The forerunner of this statute is
said to have been modeled after the Georgia statute. Thompson v. Town of
Frostproof, 89 Fla. 92, 103 So. 118 (1925).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 87-301 to -310 (Supp. 1955).
43. A modified form of a validation statute in the Kansas City Charter provided for a declaration of the validity of an ordinance establishing taxing or
assessment districts and declaring liens on land benefited by public improvements. It is construed in the well-known case of Fidelity Nat I Bank & Trust
Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927).
44. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 66.210, 66.310 (1955).
45. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 4314-18 (1943).
46. OKLA. STAT., tit. 70, §§ 15-1 to 15-15 (Supp. 1955). See Matlock v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 281 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1955).
47. See BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 146-47 (2d ed. 1941).
48. 43 AM. Jur., Public Securities & Obligations § 311 (1942) states that
this action is "in the nature of a proceeding in rem." It seems sounder to
refer to this action as a declaratory judgment binding members of a large
class, to circumvent confusion with real property aspects. Borchard calls it
"a pure action for a declaratory judgment." BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 147 (2d ed. 1941).

49. Since public school bonds are excluded from coverage by the Uniform
§ 65 (1943), the com-

Negotiable Instruments Law, 5 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT.

mon-law rule of caveat emptor applies. Under this common-law rule, the
Supreme Court in Otis v. Cullum, 92 U.S. 447 (1875), held that the vendor
of municipal bonds which were issued under an unconstitutional statute was
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all parties who might have an interest in the bond issue and pursuing
the action to final judgment, the effect of which is to bar any person
who was a party or who might later be similarly situated from raising
any issue that might have been raised in the validation proceeding.
All questions of law and fact that might subsequently be raised affecting the bonds' validity are put in repose and subsequent relitigation is precluded by application of the doctrine of res judicata. 50 This
settles once and for all that the bonds are valid obligations which
may be used for authorized purposes, and protects the school system
from spurious attacks which might be brought by litigants in favor
of or opposing segregation.
Bond validation legislation might find acceptance in the Southern
states for another reason; it confines jurisdiction to challenge the
bond's validity to the state court. A state cannot by statute limit
jurisdiction over a matter to the state courts; but a state may take
advantage of a federal rule of procedure to arrive at the same end.
not liable to his vendee for breach of implied warranty. The risk that a bond

will be declared illegal and thereby cause the holder to suffer loss, by being
unable to recover from his vendor, has led to the statutes which expressly
provide for judicial determination of the validity of the bond prior to issue.
See 1 HOWARD L. REV. 286, 287-88 (1955).
The Florida bond validation statute provides, for example, that "such
decree shall be forever conclusive as to all matters adjudicated against the
petitioner and all parties affected thereby, including all property owners,
taxpayers and citizens . . . and all others having or claiming any right, title
or interest in property to be affected by the issuance of said bonds .... .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 75.09 (1) (Supp. 1956).
Cases bear out the intention of the statute. See Florida v. Citrus County,
116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4 (1934); Street v. Town of Ripley, 173 Miss. 225, 161
So. 855 (1935). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 782 (1950).
50. An argument based on the doctrine of the Sunnen case, creating an
exception in tax cases to the rule of res judicata, in which a prior litigated
issue may be reopened on collateral attack on the ground of a change in the
tax law since the original suit might be urged. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591 (1948), 61 HARV. L. REv. 1463.
However this exception to the doctrine of res judicata does not seem likely to
expand into non-tax cases. Three points might be brought out to substantiate
this statement: (1) the Sunnen exception applies to situations where res
judicata would bind the parties by "collateral estoppel," rather than when
the action is precluded by the doctrine of "bar"; (2) apparently, the exception
might be limited to the correction of minor changes where equity would
strongly urge it, and would not allow relitigation of the pivotal issues; (3)
courts have not pushed the exception with a spirit of acceptance which might
extend it to other fields.
Also it might be argued that the petitioner's right is a federal one and that
the validation judgment is not res judicata in a federal court action involving
the same right. See, e.g., Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 154 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1946),
rev'd on other grounds, 331 U.S. 40 (1947); Kan v. Tsang, 74 F. Supp. 508 (N.D.
Calif. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 939 (1949). In both cases a veteran's right to have pre-war seniority
in his old job under the Selective Service Act was enforced in a federal court
despite a contrary state declaratory judgment that no right existed. Once
more this argument should not be greatly feared as applicable to state bonds.
A state's refusal to recognize a federal statutory right, as in these cases,

should be distinguished from state recognition that a class of federal rights
exists but none exists in a particular plaintiff. See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 782
(1950).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10

Federal practice denies the federal district court removal jurisdiction
over a cause of action arising in a state court which presents a federal
question by way of defense rather than in the complaint.5 1 And,
because the assailant of the bond is joined as defendant, the only
way he can raise his federal question is by way of defense. He cannot
seek federal court relief as a plaintiff before the bonds are validated
because there is no justiciable issue; he cannot attack the judgment
of the validation suit thereafter because of the doctrine of res judicata.
Whether a federal question is involved that may be brought in
the federal court may be an important consideration from a tactical
standpoint. Southern courts are often frank in condemning the Brown
decision, and may be more reluctant to effectuate its policies than the
federal courts. Of course, the state court cannot deprive a party of
a right under the federal Constitution, and a writ of certiorari may be
had from the state's highest court to the United States Supreme Court;
however, the Supreme Court will deny review if the state court based
its decision on an adequate and independent state ground, even
though its decision on the federal question may have been wrong.5 2
Such grounds may become easier to find when the state court strives
51. Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code gives federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear "all civil actions . . . [which] arise under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant,
known as "federal question jurisdiction" has been so severely limited that
now it is much narrower than the parallel scope of appellate jurisdiction
exercised by the Supreme Court over state decisions. Stated generally, the
rule today is that the plaintiff is complete master in determining federal
question jurisdiction in the federal district courts. The court may look only
to the plaintiff's complaint to ascertain whether jurisdiction exists. The
plaintiff may neither allege an anticipated defense involving a federal
question to get into federal court, Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888),
nor may the defendant remove the action under section 1441 on the ground
of a federal question raised by defense, Tennessee v. Union and Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
"[T]he plaintiff's original cause of action,
[must arise] ...under the Constitution;" otherwise, the federal court may not
take jurisdiction although the only issue involved is a federal issue. Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
Furthermore a plaintiff under the Declaratory Judgments Act who would
otherwise be a defendant cannot be heard by the federal court upon a federal
question if the federal question would not have been raised by the opposing
party in his original bill had he brought the suit. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). The federal court will not consider
whether a substantive federal question is involved, but will consider whether
the party ordinarily plaintiff would have raised it as an essential allegation
of his complaint.
For an excellent discussion of this matter, see Trautman, Federal Right
Jurisdiction and the DeclaratoryRemedy, 7 VAND. L. REv. 445, 454-68 (1954).
See also HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
758-77 (1953).
52. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) set out
the self-imposed Supreme Court policy, now solidified into a rather absolute
rule, that the Court will not hear a case on appellate review if the case is
found to have, in addition to a federal question, a state question which is
independent and adequate to settle the matter, despite error on the state
court's determination of the federal question. This distinction between
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction and district court original jurisdiction,
supra note 51, should be noted. For a discussion of this self-imposed restraint, see HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 421-35.
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to maintain a state policy. On the other hand, a segregation question

arising in a case originating in the federal system, in addition to perhaps a more dispassionate hearing, is less likely to be blocked on its
way to the Supreme Court where many state judges had rather it
not go.
Conclusion
Drawing a thread of orderliness from the foregoing discussion, we
can now collect our observations and observe the dissipation of the
legal miasma. Attack might be made, it is feared, on bonds authorized
and issued pursuant to statutory requirements on the ground that
proceeds are to be used or are not to be used for segregated schools.
This attack will be totally ineffectual unless it can be clearly shown
that the authorization encompassed use only in segregated schools.
The best ground for standing against the attack is here. North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia dismissed the case at this point, establishing a precedent for the courts of other states to do likewise. This
is a state question, and the state courts have indicated that they will
go far in support of a policy promoting the school system. If, however, it is conceded that the bonds are authorized for segregated facilities exclusively, the issue is nonetheless not open to attack unless
the end of segregation has been decreed. Then, if the bonds are used
to finance integrated schools, the authorization is exceeded and the
bonds invalid; or if proceeds are used to continue segregated schools
despite a federal court order to cease segregation, this use may contravene the rights of private persons under the fourteenth amendment.
As a practical matter, the federal court would more likely use contempt proceedings to enforce desegregation rather than lay seige to
school finances. However, the cloud remains and the bond could be
declared invalid. The safest method of removing this cloud appears
to be through a proceeding which will judicially establish the bonds'
validity.
Concededly, the recommendation of a validation proceeding is not
made with so great an emphasis upon the legal protection it affords as
upon the restoration of the investor's confidence that there is no cloud
on the bonds' validity. Indeed the endeavor of this Note is the dissipation of legal uncertainties lambent upon the investor's sensibilities
rather than a contribution to the great body of legal knowledge. It is
hoped that the resolution of these uncertainties will result in more
favorable bids and consequently less hardship on the already beleaguered Southern school system.
JAMES S. GILLILAND

